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JUNK SCIENCE, DAUBERT, AND OHIO RULE 702 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Currently, the role of expert witnesses is under vigorous 
attack. Peter Huber coined the phrase "junk science" to 
describe judicial acceptance of unreliable expert testi-
mony. Huber, Ga/ileo's Revenge: Junk SCience in the 
Courtroom (1991). Huber's most sensational example 
involved a "soothsayer" who "with the backing of expert 
testimony from a doctor and several police department 
officials" won a million dollar jury award for the loss of 
her "psychic powers following a CAT scan." /d. at 3-4. 
Huber is by no means alone in his criticism. Articles 
such as Fanning, "Experts up to here," Forbes, July 13, 
1QR7 <=>t ~7R <=>nrl nl.,nn "Tho r,..,o .ll.n<>in.,t l=vnort 
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Witnesses," Fortune, Sept. 25, 1989, at 133, are not 
uncommon. Moreover, judicial opinions contain similar 
censure. One court argued that "it is time to take hold of 
expert testimony in federal trials" and "experts whose 
opinions. are available to the highest bidder have no 
place testifying in a court of law." In re Air Crash Disaster 
at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986). 
The "junk science" controversy even became a politi-
cal issue. President Bush's Council on Competitiveness, 
chaired by former Vice President Quayle, established a 
Federal Civil Justice Reform Task Force. "Agenda For 
Civil Justice Reform in America," reprinted in 60 U. Gin. 
L. Rev. 977 (1992). Among other things, the Task Force 
targeted expert testimony. Quayle declared: "We think it 
is time to reject the notion that 'junk science' is truly rele-
vant evidence." ':Junk Science or Junk Law?," 3 The 
Expert Witness J. (Aug./Sept. 1991). Following the 
recommendation of the Task Force, President Bush 
imposed, by executive order, stringent requirements for 
the admissibility of expert testimony. on government 
attorneys in civil cases. Civil Justice Reform, Exec. Order 
No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991). Under this order, 
to be admissible a scientific theory must be "widely 
accepted," which is defined as acceptance by at least a 
substantial minority of experts in the relevant field. 
CRIMINAL CASES 
For the most part, the "junk science" debate has 
gnored criminal litigation. Giannelli, "The ~Junk Science 
)ebate': The Criminal Cases," 84 J. Grim. L. & Criminolo-
~y 105 (1993). The failure to ta~e.account of criminal 
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prosecutions led to some remarkable results. While 
President Bush's executive order required U.S. attorneys 
in civil cases to meet a heightened admissibility standard 
("wide acceptance") when introducing scientific 
evidence, federal prosecutors were left free in the DNA 
cases to argue for a lower standard, "urg[ing] that Rule 
702 creates a liberal rule of admissibility which now 
supersedes Frye." United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 
59 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, vacated (en bane) after 
death of defendant, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991). See 
also United States v. Vee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 188 (N.D. Ohio 
1991) (prosecutors argued that Frye has been displaced), 
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Bonds, 1993 U.S. App. 
Lexis 32574 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 1993). 
Similarly, while Vice President Quayle was champion-
ing the virtues of expanded discovery in civil litigation, 
federal prosecutors were opposing discovery in the first 
major DNA case using the FBI procedure. In United 
States v. Vee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990), the 
government opposed discovery of matching criteria, 
environmental insult studies, population data, and 
proficiency tests. 
DAUBERT v. MERREll DOW PHARMACEUTICALS 
In June 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 
(1993), waded into this controversy. The Court rejected 
the "general acceptance" test, as set forth in Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as the admis-
sibility standard for scientific evidence. In its place, the 
Court substituted a reliability analysis. The initial 
commentary on the decision suggests that the 
controversy surrounding the Frye rule will not subside in 
the near future: 
"Astonishingly, all parties expressed satisfaction with 
the Daubert decision -the lawyers for the plaintiff and 
defense, and scientists who wrote amicus briefs." 
Foster et al., "Policy Forum: Science and the Toxic 
Tort," 261 Science 1509, 1614 (Sept. 17, 1993). 
"The catch ... is that no one is exactly sure what the 
new standard is:' Stewart, ''A New Test: Decision 
Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility of Expert 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
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Testimony," A.B.A. J. 48, 48 (Nov.1993). 
"[T]he opinion of the court, in rejecting the existing 
standard, has created considerable confusion." Dyk & 
Castanias, "Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts," 
Nat'l L.J. 17, 17 (Aug. 2, 1993). 
This article examines one aspect of the controversy 
over scientific evidence -the evidentiary standard for 
admitting novel scientific evidence. 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
The reliability of evidence derived from a scientific 
theory or principle depends upon three factors: 
(1) the validity of the underlying theory, 
(2) the validity of the technique applying that theory, 
and 
(3) the proper application of the technique on a particu-
lar occasion. 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence§ 1-1 (2d ed. 1993). 
The first two factors -the validity of the underlying 
theory and the validity of the technique- are distinct 
issues. One could accept, for example, the validity of the 
premise underlying "voiceprint" identification- voice 
uniqueness - but still question whether the voiceprint 
technique can identify that uniqueness. Similarly, the 
underlying psychological and physiological principles of 
polygraph testing could be acknowledged without 
endorsing the proposition that a polygraph examiner can 
detect deception by means of the polygraph technique. 
The third requirement- the proper application of a 
scientific technique on a particular occasion - raises a 
number of issues: (a) the condition of any instrumenta-
tion used in the technique, (b) adherence to proper 
procedures, and (c) the qualifications of both the person 
conducting the procedure and the person interpreting 
the results. The courts are divided over whether the 
proponent of scientific evidence must establish these 
factors as a condition of admissibility. /d. § 1-8. 
The validity of a scientific principle and the validity of 
the technique applying that principle may be established 
in a number of ways: judicial notice, legislative recogni-
tion, stipulation, or the presentation of evidence. 
Judicial Notice 
The principles underlying many scientific techniques, 
including radar, intoxication tests, fingerprints, palm 
prints, firearms identification, handwriting comparisons, 
as well as other procedures, have all been recognized by 
judicial notice. /d. § 1-2. See also Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 
2796 n. 11 (1993) ("[T)heories that are so firmly estab-
lished as to have attained the status of scientific law, 
such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are 
subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201."). 
Courts, however, do not always use the term "judicial 
notice" to express acceptance of a scientific technique. 
For example, in State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 597 
N.E.2d 107 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the 
admissibility of DNA evidence. At one point, the Court 
wrote: "No pretrial evidentiary hearing is necessary to 
determine the reliability of the DNA evidence." /d. at 501. 
The Court, in effect, is taking judicial notice of the 
reliability of DNA evidence, which means that the 
general validity of DNA typing need not be proved in 
future cases. 
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Statutory Recognition 
In some cases the validity of a scientific technique is 
recognized by statute. At one time most of these provi-
sions involved motor vehicle codes and paternity cases; 
for example, radar, intoxication tests, and blood tests are , 
often subject to legislative regulation. These techniques 
are typically subject to judicial notice as well. 
Recent enactments, however, have extended legisla-
tive recognition to more controversial techniques- for 
example, polygraph, hypnosis, DNA, rape trauma 
syndrome, and battered wife syndrome evidence. Many 
of these techniques would not be subject to judicial 
notice. Giannelli & lmwinkelreid, supra, § 1"3. 
The interpretation of these statutes may raise constitu-
tional questions. For example, in State v. Vega, 12 Ohio 
St. 3d 185, 465 N.E.2d 1303 (1984), the Ohio Supreme 
Court held that once a scientific technique (intoxilyzer) 
has been legislatively recognized "an accused may not 
make a general attack upon the reliability and validity of 
the breath testing instrument." /d. at 190. Accord Colum-
bus v. Day, 24 Ohio App. 3d 173, 174, 493 N.E.2d 1002, 
1003 (1985). 
This is wrong. It is one thing to legislate the admission 
of a certain type of evidence, it is quite another thing to 
preclude the accused from attacking such evidence. 
Federal and Ohio Evidence Rule 104(e) provide that a 
judge's ruling on admissibility does not limit the "right of 
a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to 
weight or credibility." In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 
(1986), the U.S. Supreme Court cited Rule 104(e) in hold-
ing that a trial judge's decision to admit a confession 
does not deprive an accused of the right to contest the 
reliability of the confession before the jury. According to 
the Court, a contrary rule deprives the accused of a fair 
trial: "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process 
Clause ... or in the Compulsory Process or Confronta-
tion Clauses of the Sixth Amendment ... , the Constitu-
tion guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.' " /d. at 690 
(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 
Several courts have accepted this constitutional argu-
ment in scientific evidence cases. E.g., Barcott v. Dept. of 
Public Safety, 741 P.2d 226, 228-29 (Alaska 1987); People 
v. Thompson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (Cal. App. 1989); 
State v. Lowther, 740 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Hawaii 1987). See 
also lmwinkelried & Scofield, "The Recognition of an 
Accused's Constitutional Right to Introduce Expert 
Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Science 
Evidence: The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken 
Assumption in California v. Trombetta," 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 
59 (1991). 
Stipulation 
The validity of a scientific technique also may be 
established by stipulation. For example, many courts 
admit polygraph evidence if the prosecution and defense 
stipulate prior to trial that the results of the polygraph 
examination are admissible. State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.3d 
123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978). 
As one court has noted: '[T]he primary effect of the 
stipulation is that it operates as a waiver of objection or 
challenge to the validity of the basic theory of polygraph 
graph testing and eliminates the necessity of or the 
opportunity for the parties to establish a foundation in 
each case to satisfy the trial court of the basic theory and 
validity of polygraphs." State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628; 
637 (Wis. 1981). 
Evidence 
A novel scientific technique is rarely so well estab-
lished that a court would take judicial notice of its validity 
the first time evidence derived from the technique is 
offered at trial. Statutory recognition or stipulation are 
even less likely. Accordingly, the validity of a new tech-
nique is typically established through the introduction of 
evidence, including expert testimony. Offers of proof, 
affidavits, stipulations, and learned treatises may also be 
considered. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 
1241 (3d Cir. 1985). 
Courts have employed several different tests to deter-
mine admissibility in this context. In addition to Frye and 
Daubert, some courts have adopted a "relevancy" 
approach, while others have adopted a "Frye plus" test. 
FRYE: THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TEST 
In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the 
D.C. Circuit considered the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence as a case of first impression. The court wrote: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses 
the line between the experimental and demonstrable 
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight 
zone the evidential force of the principle must be 
recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in 
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from 
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs. /d. at 1014. 
fhe court went on to hold that the polygraph had "not yet 
~ained such standing and scientific recognition among 
Jhysiological and psychological authorities." /d. Thus, it 
s not enough that a qualified expert, or even several 
~xperts, testifies that a particular technique is valid. Frye 
mposes a special burden: the technique must be gene r-
Illy accepted by the relevant scientific community. 
Vlajority Rule 
In the ensuing years, Frye's general acceptance stan-
lard became the majority rule in this country. See United 
)tates v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
Frye "has been followed uniformly in this and other 
;ircuits."); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) 
"This criterion of 'general acceptance' in the scientific 
:ommunity has come to be the standard in almost all the 
:ourts in the country which have considered the question 
1f the admissibility of scientific evidence."). 
In addition to polygraph evidence, Frye has been used 
J determine the admissibility of evidence derived from 
oiceprint analysis, neutron activation analysis, gunshot 
9sidue tests, bite mark comparisons, psycholinguistics, 
·uth serum, scanning electroo microscopic analysis, 
ypnosis, blood analysis, hair analysis, intoxication test-
lg, DNA profiling, rape trauma syndrome, and numer-
us other forensic techniques. 
The principal justification for the general acceptance 
tandard is that it tends to ensure the reliability of scien-
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tific evidence. The D.C. Circuit has stated: "The require-
ment of general acceptance in the scientific. community 
assures that those most qualified to assess the general 
validity of a scientific method will have a determinative 
voice." United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See also People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 
171, 194 (Mich. 1977) (Frye "permits the experts who 
know most about a procedure to experiment and to study 
it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury, which must 
first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before 
the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of fact."). 
Criticism 
Notwithstanding its widespread judicial adoption, 
commentators have criticized Frye. Professor Strong 
commented that Frye "tends to obscure ... proper 
considerations by asserting an undefinable general 
acceptance as the principal if not sole determinative 
factor." Strong, "Questions Affecting the Admissibility of 
Scientific Evidence," 1970 U. Ill. L.F. 1, 14. Another 
commentator identified Frye's "main drawbacks [as] its 
inflexibility, confusion of issues, and superfluity." McCor-
mick, "Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to 
Admissibility," 67 Iowa l. Rev. 879, 915 (1982). 
Accordingly, in recent years an increasing number of 
courts rejected the general acceptance test. The federal 
cases include: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786; 
794 (2d Cir. 1992) (DNA evidence), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988 
(3d Cir. 1985) (innersole shoe comparison), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1172 (1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (psychological testimony on 
eyewitness identifications); United States v. Williams, 
583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (voiceprints), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). 
A number of state courts have also rejected Frye. E.g., 
Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Ark. 1991) (DNA 
evidence); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 
1980) (semen test), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); 
State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Hawaii 1992) 
(DNA evidence); State v. Rodgers, 812 P.2d 1208, 1210 
(Idaho 1991) (blood spatter analysis); State v. Hall, 297 
N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980) (blood flight characteristics), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); State v. Williams, 388 
A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (voiceprints); Kelly v. State, 824 
S.W.2d 568, 571-72 (Tex. Grim. App. 1992) (DNA 
evidence); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491,504 
(Va.) (multisystem electrophoretic blood test), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). 
The U.S. Supreme Court joined this trend in Daubert. 
According to the Court, "[t]hat austere standard [Frye], 
absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials." 113 S. 
Ct. at 2794. 
Ohio Rule on Scientific Evidence 
Ohio was also one of these states. In State v. Williams, 
4 Ohio St.3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983), a case involving 
the admissibility of voiceprints, the Ohio Supreme Court 
rejected the Frye test. According to the Court, "the Rules 
of Evidence establish adequate preconditions for admis-
sibility of expert testimony, and we leave to the discretion 
of this state's judiciary, on a case by case basis, to decide 
whether the questioned testimony is relevant and will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue." /d. 58. This leaves the trial 
court without much guidance. 
The Court recently reaffirmed this position in State v. 
Pierce, 64 Ohio St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d 107 (1992), which 
admitted DNA evidence: "This court in Williams rejected 
the Frye standard, preferring a more flexible approach." 
/d. at 496. The Court elaborated: 
The standard for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence in Ohio as found in State v. Williams is wheth-
er the questioned evidence is relevant and will assist 
the trier of fact in understanding evidence presented or 
in determining a fact in issue ... Any rebuttal evidence 
goes to weight rather than admissibility. We, therefore, 
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the DNA evidence in this case. /d. at 497. 
RELEVANCY TEST 
Jettisoning Frye is one thing; replacing it with some-
thing that works is another. As Professor Rossi has 
noted, "even if a court abandons the Frye test, the relia-
bility issue must still be faced." Rossi, Expert Witnesses 
34 (1991). 
One alternative to Frye is to treat scientific evidence in 
the same way as other evidence, weighing its probative 
vaiue against countervailing dange;s and conside;ations. 
Professor McCormick advocated this position. In his 
1954 text, he wrote: 
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition 
upon the court's taking judicial notice of scientific 
facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientif-
ic evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are 
supported by a qualified expert witness should be 
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. 
Particularly, its probative value may be overborne by 
the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the 
jury, unfair surprise and undue consumption of time. 
McCormick, Evidence 363-64 (1954) (emphasis added). 
This approach is not without problems. The probative 
value of scientific evidence depends on its reliability. See 
United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90,94-95 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972) ("The acceptance of the basic theory [of the 
polygraph] is a part of the process of making the 
evidence relevant."). 
However, since most trial judges do not possess the 
scientific background to determine relevance/reliability, 
the judge "will generally be forced to accept the proba-
tive value of the evidence as what a qualified expert testi-
fies it to be." Strong, supra, at 22. In effect, qualifying the 
expert presumptively qualifies the technique. Such an 
approach provides an insufficient threshold standard for 
admissibility. "[l]t seems questionable whether the 
relevancy approach will adequately protect against the 
misuse of unreliable scientific evidence." Giannelli, "The 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later," 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 
1245 (1980). 
Daubert implicitly rejects this approach. 
DAUBERT: THE RELIABILITY APPROACH 
In Daubertthe Supreme Court replaced Frye with a 
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reliability analysis. The Court based its decision on Rule 
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical 
to the Ohio rule. It reads: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. 
As noted above, the Court found the rule inconsistent 
with Frye. However, the Court did not adopt McCormick's 
lax relevancy st9ndard. Instead, the Court derived a relia-
bility test from the phrase "scientific knowledge" in Rule 
702. The Court commented: 
[l]n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an infer-
ence or assertion must be derived by the scientific 
method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropri;:lte validation- i.e., "good grounds," based 
on what is known. In short, the requirement that an 
expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" 
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 113 S. 
Ct. at 2795. 
Under the Daubert analysis, the trial court determines 
admissibility, a task that "entails a preliminary assess-
ment of whether the reasoning or methodology underly-
ing the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether 
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied 
to the facts in issue." /d. at 2796. 
Enumerated Factors 
According to Daubert, in performing this "gatekeeping 
function," the trial court may consider a number of 
factors. First, the court should determine whether the 
scientific theory or technique has been tested. To 
support its position, the Supreme Court cited authorities 
on the philosophy of science: "[T]he statements 
constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of 
empirical test." Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 
49 (1966). "[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a 
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." 
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of 
Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989). 
Second, whether a theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication is "a relevant, 
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the 
scientific validity." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. The peer 
review and publication process increases the likelihood 
that flaws will be discovered. 
Third, a technique's "known or potential rate of error" 
is also a relevant factor. /d. As an example the Supreme 
Court cited United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 
(7th Cir. 1989) (surveying studies of the error rates for 
"voiceprints"). 
Fourth, the "existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique's operation" is another indici-
um of trustworthiness. 113 S. Ct. at 2797. As an example 
the Court cited United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 
1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting professional organization's 
standards governing "voiceprints"), cert. denied, 439 
u.s. 1117 (1979). 
Finally, "general acceptance" remains a factor in 
assessing reliability. Although the Court rejected "gener-
al acceptance" as the sole criterion for admissibility, it 
recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability of 
scientific evidence: "Widespread acceptance can be an 
important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, 
and 'a known technique that has been able to attract only 
minimal support within the community' ... may properly 
be viewed with skepticism." 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (citation 
omitted). 
Other Factors 
The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that the 
Rule 702 standard is "a flexible one." /d. The enumerated 
factors are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. The Court 
stated: "Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do 
not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." /d. at 
2796. In an accompanying footnote, the Court wrote: "A 
number of authorities have presented variations on the 
reliability approach, each with its own slightly different 
factors ... To the extent that they focus on the reliability 
of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its 
underlying principles, all these versions may well have 
merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of 
their particular details." /d. at 2797 n. 12. 
In that footnote, the Court cited Judge Weinstein and 
Professor Berger's treatise; those authors list the follow-
ing factors: 
(1) the technique's general acceptance in the field, 
(2) the expert's qualifications and stature, 
( 3) the use which has been made of the new technique, 
( 4) the potential rate of error, 
( 5) the existence of specialized literature, 
(6) the novelty of the new invention, and 
( 7) the extent to which the technique relies on the subjec-
tive interpretation of the expert. 3 Weinstein & Berg-
er, Weinstein's Evidence 702-41 to -42 (1993). 
The Court also cited McCormick, "Scientific Evidence: 
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility," 67 Iowa 
L.Rev. 879, 911-12 (1982) (listing 11 factors). 
FRYE "PLUS" 
Some commentators have argued there is a fourth 
approach. They cite several DNA cases that have en-
grafted an additional requirement onto the Frye standard. 
This approach has been labeled "Frye Plus." Goldberg, 
"A New Day for DNA?," 78 A.B.A.J. 84,84 (Apr. 1992). 
DNA Cases 
For example, in People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 
:sup. Ct. 1989), the court set forth a three-pronged 
:malysis. According to the court, the admissibility of DNA 
~vidence depends upon a showing that (1) the underlying 
heory has been generally accepted, (2) the procedures 
mplementing the theory have been generally accepted, 
md (3) the testing laboratory has followed these pro-
;edures./d. at 987. Because of the "complexity" of DNA 
malysis and its "powerful impact" on a jury, the court 
1eld that "passing muster under Frye alone is 
nsufficient." /d. 
The court further concluded that the prosecution had 
•atisfied the first two prongs but not the third: "In a pierc-
ng attack upon each molecule of evidence presented, 
he defense was successful in demonstrating to this 
:ourt that the testing laboratory failed in its responsibility 
J perform the accepted scientific techniques and experi-
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nients in several major respects." /d. at 996. 
In United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 
1990), reh'g granted, vacated en bane as moot after 
defendant's death, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991), the 
Eighth Circuit adopted the Castro approach: 
Because DNA evidence is so new and the resulting 
prejudice to the defendant is sufficiently great, it is 
imperative that the court satisfy itself that there exists a 
sufficient foundational basis as to the overall admissi-
bility of the evidence. This must be done before the 
government exposes the jury to the lab results. /d. at 60. 
The Second Circuit, however, rejected this approach in 
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992). The court referred to this 
"elevated standard" as "even more stringent than that in 
Frye." /d. at 794-95. 
Misleading Label 
As noted in the beginning of this article, the third prong 
in Castro is a logical step in establishing the reliability of 
scientific evidence. A valid technique improperly applied 
will produce erroneous results. This requirement, howev-
er, predates the DNA cases. A number of courts had held 
that the failure to establish adherence to proper proce-
dures results in the exclusion of evidence: "It is widely 
recognized that the party offering the results of laborato-
ry tests must . .. vouch for its correct administration in 
the particular case." United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 
570, 574 (E. D. Pa. 1971) (chromatographic analysis of 
ink). See also 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, supra, at 36 
(listing cases involving polygraph, voiceprint, as well as 
other types of scientific evidence that adopt this posi-
tion). 
Radar evidence is a good example. The reliability of 
radar evidence depends on (1) the validity of the underly-
ing theory (e.g., the Doppler effect), (2) the validity of the 
technique applying that theory (e.g., the particular model 
of radar), and (3) the proper application of the technique 
on a particular occasion (e.g., use of tuning forks to cali-
brate). 
Furthermore, this requirement need not be tied to the 
Frye test. It could be required in a jurisdiction that rejects 
Frye. Indeed, even after Daubertthe Eighth Circuit 
continued to impose this requirement: 
We believe that the reliability inquiry set forth in 
Daubert mandates that there be a preliminary showing 
that the expert properly performed a reliable methodol-
ogy in arriving at his opinion .... In order to determine 
whether scientific testimony is reliable, the court must 
conclude that the testimony was derived from the 
application of a reliable methodology or principle in the 
particular case. 
Thus, we conclude that the court should make an 
initial inquiry into the particular expert's application of 
the scientific principle or methodology in question. The 
court should require the testifying expert to provide 
affidavits attesting that he properly performed the 
protocols involved in DNA profiling. United States v. 
Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 126 L.Ed.2d 697 (1994). 
Compliance with the third prong can be decided only 
on a case by case basis. See National Academy of 
Sciences, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 134 
! . 
(1992) (This assumption- "that the analytical work done 
for a particular trial comports with proper procedure-
can be resolved only case by case and is always open to 
question, even if the general reliability of DNA typing is 
fully accepted in the scientific community"). This issue, 
therefore, is never subject to judicial notice. 
DAUBERT'S EFFECT ON THE STATES 
Daubert's effect on state jurisdictions depends on 
several factors. Daubert rests on an interpretation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, a federal statute. The Court 
stated: "We interpret the legislatively-enacted Fe-deral 
Rules of Evidence as we would any statute." Daubert, 113 
S. Ct. at 2793. 
Frye Jurisdictions 
As a statutory rather than a constitutional case, 
Daubert is not binding on the states, which are therefore 
free to continue to follow Frye. This is true even in the 35 
jurisdictions that have adopted evidence rules based on 
the Federal Rules. See Joseph & Saltzburg, The Federal 
Rules of Evidence in the States iii (1992) (preface). 
Two post-Daubert opinions illustrate this point. In one 
case, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected Frye in 
favor of the Daubert approach. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 
192 (N.M. 1993). In the other, the Arizona Supreme Court 
deciined io foiiow Daubert, noting that it vvas "not bound 
by the United States Supreme Court's non-constitutional 
construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence when we 
construe the Arizona Rules of Evidence." State v. Bible, 
858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993) (excluding DNA probabil-
ity evidence). 
It would not be difficult for a state supreme court that 
favored Frye to reject Daubert's statutory analysis. In 
Bible the Arizona Supreme Court also remarked: "Our 
rules ... are court-enacted. While the United States 
Supreme Court considers congressional purpose, this 
court- when construing a rule we have adopted- must 
rely on text and our own intent in adopting or amending 
the rule in the first instance." /d. 
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted an 
unpersuasive and much-criticized "plain meaning" 
construction in interpreting the Federal Rules. See 
Becker & Orenstein, "The Federal Rules of Evidence 
After Sixteen Years- The Effect of 'Plain Meaning' 
Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on 
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective 
Revision of the Rules," 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 857, 863 
(1992) (commenting on "the potential mischief that can 
result from a rigid plain meaning analysis of the Rules"); 
Jonakait, "The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the 
Changed Rules of Evidence," 68 Tex. L. Rev. 745, 786 
(1990) ("Inevitably, ... the plain-meaning standard will 
produce worse evidence law by freezing evidence into a 
literalistic mold, by eliminating its dynamism, and by 
mandating results without any attempt to satisfy the 
policy goals of evidence law."). 
Non-Frye Jurisdictions 
Daubert's influence on jurisdictions that had previously 
jettisoned Frye is also uncertain. As noted earlier, a 
substantial number of jurisdictions, including Ohio, had 
abandoned Frye before Daubert was decided. If such a 
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jurisdiction had adopted McCormick's relevancy 
approach, a shift to Daubert's reliability approach would 
presumably result in a more demanding inquiry. The 
Ohio Supreme Court seemed to make an independent 
analysis of the reliability of DNA in Pierce, which would 
be consistent with Daubert. It is less than clear, however, 
that the Ohio Supreme Court intended the type of relia-
bility inquiry envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
No Difference 
Finally, even if a jurisdiction adopts Daubert, a scientific 
techniqlJe's admissibility status may not change. Some 
commentators have argued that "[i]n practice ... courts 
today all tend to admit the same evidence whether or not 
they purport to apply the Frye standard." Weinstein, "Improv-
ing Expert Testimony," 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 478 (1986). 
This view, however, is suspect. Frye played a deter-
minative role in the voiceprint cases. As several courts 
have observed: "[W]hen the Frye test has been applied, 
courts have tended to exclude expert voice identification 
evidence based on spectrography. The courts are equal-
ly likely to admit the evidence when the Frye test is not 
applied." State v. Free, 493 So. 2d 781, 785 (La. App. 
1986), cert. denied, 499 So.2d 83 (1987). See also State v. 
Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1236 n.6 (Ariz 1984)("Some 
courts following the Frye rule, refuse to allow spectro-
graphic evidence ... Other courts, generally following 
modifications of Frye or not mentioning it at aii, have 
allowed spectrographic evidence."). 
With other techniques, however, the admissibility stan-
dard has not made a difference. For example, no report-
ed case has excluded bite mark comparisons, including 
courts that applied the general acceptance standard, 
e.g., United States v. Martin, 13 M.J. 66, 67-68 (C. M.A. 
1982); People v. Middleton, 429 N.E.2d 100, 103-04 (N.Y. 
1981), and those courts that employed other analyses. 
E.g., Handley v. State, 515 So. 2d 121, 130-,31 (Ala. Grim. 
App. 1987); Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 750-,52 
(Tex. Grim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 932 (1991). 
Similarly, courts in non-Frye jurisdictions have excluded 
evidence based on controversial techniques. For example 
in State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751 (Or. 1984) (en bane), the ' 
Oregon Supreme Court rejected the Frye test, but then 
went on to exclude polygraph evidence under the 
Oregon Rules of Evidence. The court wrote: "Notwith-
standing the usual deference to trial court discretion, we 
as an appellate court retain our role to determine the 
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Oregon 
Evidence Code." /d. at 775. 
The Delaware Supreme Court spurned Frye but never-
theless excluded hypnotically-refreshed testimony under 
the Delaware Rules. State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601, 605 
(Del. 1985) ("[T]he State has not demonstrated that hypnotic 
recall is sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence ... "). 
The same result has occurred in several truth serum 
cases. See Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); Harper v. State, 292 
S.E.2d 389, 395-96 (Ga. 1982) (rejecting Frye rule but 
nevertheless excluding truth serum evidence as unreliable). 
CODIFICATION 
Daubert may provide the impetus to amend Federal 
Rule 702 or its state counterparts. One commentary 
observed: "Daubert does not provide the easily applied, 
objective and consistent test that many courts and liti-
gants had hoped it would. This may well create pres-
sures to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence." Dyk & 
Castanias, "Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts," 
Nat'l L.J. 17, 20 (Aug. 2, 1993). 
The Federal Rules 
In 1986 several commentators proposed amendments 
to Rule 702. Professor Lederer proposed adding the 
word "reliable" before the phrase "scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge" in Rule 702. Lederer, 
"Resolving the Frye Dilemma: A Reliability Approach," 
26 Jurimetrics J. 240 (1986). 
Professor Berger proposed adding a second sentence 
to the rule: "When the witness seeks to testify about a 
scientific principle or technique that has not previously 
been accorded judicial recognition, the testimony shall 
be admitted if the court determines that its probative 
value outweighs the dangers specified in Rule 403." 
Berger, "A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific 
Evidence," 26 Jurimetrics J. 245 (1986). 
Professor Starrs proposed adding a second sentence 
to Rule 702: "In the case of expert testimony based upon 
a scientific theory or technique, the court shall find that 
the theory or technique in question is scientifically valid 
for the purposes for which it is tendered." Starrs, "Frye v. 
United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal 
to Amend Federal Evidence Ruie 702," 26 Jurimeirics J. 
249 (1986). See also "Rules for Admissibility of Scientific 
Evidence," 115 F. A.D. 79 (1987). 
In 1991 the Civil Rules Committee proposed its own 
amendment, which required expert testimony to be based 
on "reasonably reliable" information. "Preliminary Draft 
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence," 137 
F. A.D. 53, 156 (1991). This provision apparently embodies 
a modified Frye rule. The drafting committee note states: 
This standard "does not mandate a return to the strictures 
of Frye v. United States. . .. However, the court is called 
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises 
acking any significant support and acceptance within 
:he scientific community .. . "/d. at 157. 
The Bush Administration also proposed an amend-
nent to Rule 702. Its Task Force recommended three 
;hanges: (1) expert testimony must "substantially" assist 
he trier of fact (currently, it need only "assist"); (2) expert 
estimony must be "based on a widely accepted explana-
ory theory"; and (3) experts are prohibited from accept-
ng contingent fees. "Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in 
\merican," supra, at 1049. 
>iate Rules of Evidence 
There are few models in other jurisdictions. State 
tdoptions of the Federal Rules are simply "silent regard-
lg the viability of Frye." 2 Joseph & Saltzburg, supra, 
lule 702, at 17. Only Michigan has addressed the issue 
xplicitly in the text of Rule 702; that rule requires expert 
3stimony be based on "recognized" scientific, technical, 
r other knowledge. Mich. A. Evid. 702. 
A proposed New York rule provides the most detailed 
xample, even though New York has yet to adopt the 
ederal Rules. Proposed N.Y. R. Evid. 702(b) reads: 
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Scientific testimony. Testimony concerning scientific 
matters, or testimony concerning the result of a scientific 
procedure, test or experiment is admissible provided: 
(1) there is general acceptance within the scientific 
community of the validity of the theory or principle 
underlying the matter, procedure, test or experiment; 
(2) there is general acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community that the procedure, test or experi-
ment is reliable and produces accurate results; and 
(3) the particular test, procedure or experiment was 
conducted in such a way as to yield an accurate result. 
Upon request of a party, a determination pursuant to 
this subdivision shall be made before the commence-
ment of trial. New York State Law Revision Comm'n, A 
Code of Evidence for the State of New York (1991) 
(submitted to the 1991-92 session of the Legislature by 
Gov. Mario Cuomo). 
In effect, this proposal codifies the Castro case; it adopts 
the "Frye plus" approach. 
Proposed Ohio Rule 702 
A recent proposed amendment to Ohio Rule 702 tracks 
the New York format, but does not adopt Frye. It reads: 
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts. A witness may testify 
as an expert if: 
(A) the witness' testimony relates to matters beyond 
the knowledge or experience possessed by lay 
persons or dispels a misconception common among 
lay persons; 
(B) the witness is qualified as an expert by special-
ized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
regarding the subject matter of the testimony; and 
(C) the witness' testimony is based on reliable scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized information. To the 
extent that the testimony reports the result of a proce-
dure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable only if: 
( 1 ) the theory upon which the procedure, test, or 
experiment is based is objectively verifiable or is 
validly derived from widely accepted knowledge, 
facts, or principles; 
(2) the design of the procedure, test, or experiment 
reliably implements the theory; and 
(3) the particular procedure, test, or experiment was 
conducted in a way that will yield an accurate result. 
66 Ohio Bar J. xliii (Oct. 18, 1993). 
Rule 702(C)(1) of this proposal offers alternative ways to 
establish the validity of a scientific theory; it may either 
be "objectively verifiable" or "widely accepted." Rule 
702(C)(3) addresses the "Frye plus" issue; the proponent 
must establish that the technique was applied correctly 
in the particular case. 
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY 
The Frye-Daubert controversy should be understood in 
a larger context. Another important development 
concerning scientific evidence relates to a procedural, 
rather than an evidentiary, rule. A recent amendment to 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective 
Dec. 1, 1993) expands pretrial discovery by requiring the 
prosecution to disclose a written summary of an expert's 
testimony, including the expert's opinion, the bases for 
the opinion, and the witness' qualifications. Fed. A. Grim. 
P. 16(a)(1)(E) now reads: 
(E) Expert Witnesses: At the defendant's request, the 
government shall disclose to the defendant a written 
summary of testimony the government intends to use 
under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence during its case in chief at trial. This summary 
must describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and 
the reasons therefor, and the witnesses' qualifications. 
As a matter of reciprocity, the amendment also applies to 
the defense. Fed. R. Grim. P. 16(b){1)(C). 
The necessity for discovery has long been recognized. 
·The ABA Standards note: 'The need for full and fair 
disclosure is especially apparent with respect to scientific 
proof and the testimony of experts ... [l]t is virtually 
impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be 
distorted or misused because of its advance disclosure." 
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ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure 
Before Trial66 (Approved Draft 1970). Similarly, the 
National Academy of Sciences DNA report states: "The 
prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to 
defense counsel and experts retained by the defendant 
all material that might be necessary in evaluating the 
evidence." National Research Council, DNA Technology 
in Forensic Science 146 (1992). 
No longer will the prosecution be able to disclose only 
a laboratory report providing a mere summary of "the 
results of an unidentified test conducted by an anony-
mous technician." United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 
1114, 1123 (5th Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., dissenting). For a 
further discussion of discovery, see Giannelli, "Criminal 
Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA," 44 Vand. L. 
Rev. 791 (1991). 
